Monday, February 2, 2026

 Trump's Cuba Gambit

Scandal Management Using Nuclear Brinkmanship At The Cost Of Hemispheric Alienation









Einar Tangen, Asian Narratives, Feb 2, 2026

President Trump’s escalating confrontation over Cuba represents a dangerous convergence of short-term nuclear risks and long-term strategic collapse—a foreign policy increasingly defined by aggressive unilateralism that appears timed more to manage downward spiraling domestic political crises than to execute a coherent international or regional strategy.

The synchronization of events reveals a troubling pattern. On January 30, 2026, President Trump signed an executive order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” declaring a national emergency and explicitly naming Russia and China as “malign actors” while threatening tariffs against any nation supplying Cuba with oil.

The order formally declares Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” and establishes a tariff system allowing for additional duties on imports from countries that provide oil to the island. It mandates the Secretary of Commerce to monitor suppliers, with the Secretary of State recommending tariff levels to the President.

Within twenty-four hours, on January 31, the Department of Justice released a massive tranche of files related to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein—millions of pages creating significant political exposure.

The DOJ’s own press release included an unusual disclaimer that some documents contain untrue and sensationalist claims against President Trump, a caveat applied only to Trump and not others mentioned, without explanation of how such veracity was determined.

It is therefore difficult to see the timing as coincidental, as it repeats a pattern. Whenever politically damaging domestic narratives intensify—from Epstein revelations to mounting legal scrutiny—Trump’s foreign policy becomes markedly more aggressive and confrontational, systematically attempting to shift media attention toward external threats.

This pattern extends beyond Cuba. The January 2026 military operation that abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, cutting Cuba’s primary oil lifeline, followed months of increasing domestic legal pressures on Trump in terms of the Epstein Files, his tariff authority, siding costs and his fracturing political base. The escalation ladder appears calibrated not to regional realities but to the news cycle of Trump’s personal troubles.

The Cuba executive order is unprecedented in its explicit confrontation with nuclear powers. Unlike Cold War-era proxy conflicts, Trump has directly named Russia, with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and China, with the third-largest, as the core justification for his Caribbean intervention. He specifically cited Russia’s signals intelligence facility in Cuba and China’s defense cooperation with the island, framing Cuba as a platform threatening U.S. hemispheric dominance.

This rhetoric consciously evokes the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis but with a critical difference: then, the confrontation emerged from strategic surprise; today, Trump is deliberately manufacturing a crisis over long-standing intelligence partnerships, using economic warfare as an escalatory mechanism.

The immediate risks are severe, beginning with direct great power confrontation. The U.S. is not merely pressuring a client state but directly targeting core Russian and Chinese strategic interests in the hemisphere.

The threat of a total energy blockade risks a humanitarian catastrophe, potentially collapsing Cuba’s economy, crippling its electrical grid, hospitals, and water systems, and triggering mass migration and Caribbean-wide destabilization. Most perilously, backing major nuclear powers into a corner over what they view as sovereign partnerships creates unpredictable escalation dynamics and the risk of miscalculation.

Yet the rushed, reactive quality of these moves—on top of the upheaval in Venezuela, undertaken without apparent planning for governance or regional coordination—again suggests crisis manufacturing rather than crisis management. It appears less about achieving specific security outcomes than about creating a dramatic foreign confrontation sufficiently potent to dominate news cycles otherwise focused on domestic scandals. While Trump gambles with nuclear powers for political gain, he is simultaneously burning bridges with Latin America that will haunt U.S. interests for decades.

The political rupture is no longer subtle. The postponement of the 10th Summit of the Americas, initially scheduled for December 2025, was a diplomatic siren. The Dominican Republic, a traditional U.S. ally, delayed the summit citing “profound divergences” and “deep divisions currently hindering a productive dialogue in the region.” The cause was U.S. insistence on excluding Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. This followed announcements by Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Colombian President Gustavo Petro that they would not attend due to these exclusions.

This echoed the 2022 Los Angeles Summit, where multiple heads of state boycotted over exclusionary tactics. The only successful summit in two decades that included all thirty-five American nations was in 2015, when the Obama administration yielded to regional pressure and invited Cuba. The lesson is clear: inclusive dialogue is the regional norm; U.S. unilateralism is the aberration.

Latin American leaders from across the political spectrum have consistently defended national sovereignty against U.S. coercion. Cuba’s Foreign Ministry articulated the regional consensus, stating on February 2, 2026, that it “does not harbor, support, finance, or permit terrorist or extremist organizations” and called for “constructive engagement” and “respectful and reciprocal dialogue… based on mutual interest and international law,” a position supported by Pope Leo but one ignored by the Trump administration.

Trump’s approach rests on three aggressive pillars that run counter to regional preferences. The first is maximum pressure through economic strangulation, using an oil embargo and threatening third-country tariffs. This treats sanctions not as diplomatic tools but as economic warfare with civilians as collateral. A strategy critics label the “Donroe Doctrine,” a twenty-first-century colonialist revival asserting U.S. political and property rights over the hemisphere. Its goal echoes the 1960 Mallory Memorandum, which advocated creating “hunger, desperation and overthrow of government” by denying Cuba “money and supplies”—a sixty-six-year-old strategy revived.

The second pillar is gunboat diplomacy, using naval buildups and strikes on alleged drug vessels to project arbitrary force rather than build meaningful cooperation.

The third is the revival of the Monroe Doctrine as an assertion of absolute US hemispheric dominance, framed as countering Chinese and Russian “malign influence” but reflecting Trump's personal desire for regional hegemony. A desire he believes will get him added to Mount Rushmore, where he already has a place picked out.

It is a strategy that has demonstrably failed for over six decades in Cuba, while inflicting severe humanitarian costs, and actively driving Havana closer to the very rivals—China and Russia—Washington seeks to counter. Trump has not only continued it, but weaponized it further, even threatening Mexico, a critical ally that accounts for an estimated forty-four percent of Cuba’s foreign oil supply, with tariffs if it continues shipments. The message to Latin America is unmistakable: comply with U.S. demands or face economic or even military punishment, regardless of sovereignty.

Faced with this coercive reality, Latin American nations are not merely protesting—they are actively pursuing strategies to reduce their exposure to the United States.

Trump’s chaotic, scandal-driven foreign policy is accelerating three critical trends.

There is a growing rejection of unilateralism, as countries openly defy U.S. dictates, from Colombia initially resisting deportation flights to Mexico exploring ways to maintain oil shipments to Cuba despite tariff threats.

Nations are also diversifying international alliances to avoid the U.S.-declared sphere of influence, deepening ties with alternative powers like Europe and, in many cases, China.

Cuba’s survival model—sustaining its economy through agreements with China, Russia, the EU, Canada, and Mexico despite the U.S. embargo—is becoming a template. Regional experts describe this as a rational response to a U.S. “strategy of confrontation” that punishes states for exercising their sovereignty.

Most consequentially, there is a long-term shift toward reducing dependency on the U.S.-dominated financial architecture. U.S. sanctions create a “chilling effect” where international banks avoid entire regions for fear of secondary penalties, driving up transaction costs and creating financial exclusion. The logical conclusion is the accelerated development of alternative payment systems and financial channels independent of U.S. control—exactly what Washington claims to fear from rapidly developing dollar-alternative trade settlement systems.

The effort against Cuba is further prosecuted by a parallel legal track within the U.S. On February 23, 2026, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear two critical cases arising from Title III of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which creates a private right of action for U.S. nationals to sue over property expropriated by the Cuban government. The Trump administration has actively encouraged these suits, arguing that foreign sovereign immunity should not protect Cuban entities, creating a multi-front economic war that further alienates regional partners.

The volume and velocity of Trump’s actions betray their reactive, crisis-driven nature rather than a coherent strategy. In June 2025, travel restrictions on Cuban nationals were imposed. In late January 2026, the Maduro abduction occurred. On January 23, 2026, Politico reported the administration was considering a total naval blockade to halt oil imports, with the rationale that “Energy is the chokehold to kill the regime.” On January 30, the Cuba national emergency and oil tariff threats were announced. On January 31, the final Epstein files were released. By February 2026, the administration was scrambling to manage the Cuban humanitarian fallout, Mexican diplomatic tensions, and Russian and Chinese responses simultaneously.

These are not the measures actions of a sustainable regional policy but the frantic escalation of a leader seeking to change the subject—regardless of the geopolitical costs.

The domestic calculation may be working in the short term, with cable news covering the Caribbean confrontation rather than Epstein Files exclusively. But, rather than diverting attention, it will focus it on the contradictions of the US policy. The White House memo accusing Cuba of aligning with “malign actors” like Russia and China, are directly contradicted by the recently released U.S. National Defense Strategy White Paper, that explicitly downplayed both nations as security threats.

The strategic costs are staggering. The immediate danger of backing nuclear powers into a corner over Cuba risks catastrophic miscalculation reminiscent of 1962.

Hemispheric isolation grows as every Latin American nation calculates how to reduce U.S. leverage over their economies and foreign policies.

Alliance fracturing accelerates as threatening allies like Mexico with tariffs over sovereign trade decisions destroys trust that takes generations to rebuild.

Adversaries are empowered, as China and Russia gain credibility as alternatives, precisely because U.S. coercion validates the need for options, as both powers publicly signaled their support for Cuba and urged the U.S. to end the blockade.

Trump’s Caribbean offensive represents the worst of all strategic worlds, combining immediate nuclear risks with long-term alliance collapse, driven not by coherent national interest but by the news cycle of a president’s personal legal troubles.

The timing is too consistent to dismiss. As Epstein files emerge, Cuba becomes a national emergency. As domestic scrutiny intensifies, Venezuela’s government is overthrown. The pattern reveals a foreign policy increasingly untethered from strategy and anchored instead to scandal management—a dangerous basis for decisions that could trigger a great power war.

Meanwhile, Latin America is learning the lesson Trump is teaching: that partnership with the United States is conditional, coercive, and subject to the president’s arbitrary domestic political needs. The region’s unified resistance to summit exclusions and its growing pursuit of alternative alliances demonstrate that the message has been received. The lasting legacy will not be a compliant hemisphere but a transformed one, where nations systematically reduce their exposure to U.S. financial power, deepen ties with Washington’s rivals, and view American partnership as a risk to be managed rather than an asset to be cultivated.

As Cuba denied the accusations and called for “constructive engagement,” as Mexico sought diplomatic clarity while preparing for tariff threats, and as Russia and China watched the U.S. publicly escalate against Cuba, the world saw not American strength but American recklessness.

In a nuclear age, recklessness motivated by personal scandal rather than national strategy is perhaps the most dangerous gambit of all. The question is no longer whether Trump’s Cuba confrontation serves U.S. interests—the evidence suggests it serves only Trump’s. The human cost, framed by supporters of Trump's Cuba actions, like U.S. Representative Maria Elvira Salazar as a “brutal dilemma” necessary to “free Cuba forever,” is severe and intentional.

The real question is how much damage will accumulate before an inadvertent catastrophe occurs, or before Latin America is lost to alternatives no temporary political distraction can reclaim.


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